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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
FEIKENS, District Judge: 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Appellant Fulvio Stanziale (Stanziale) sued his employer 
alleging violations of the Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. S 623, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964 (Title VII), 42 U.S.C. S 2000e, the Equal Pay Act, 29 
U.S.C. S 206 et seq., the New Jersey Law Against 
Discrimination (NJLAD), N.J.S.A. S 10:5-12, and the New 
Jersey Equal Pay Act (NJEPA), N.J.S.A. S 34:11-56.2. The 
District Court granted summary judgment as to all counts 
and Stanziale now appeals. 
 
II. BACKGROUND 
 
In April 1990, appellee Lester Jargowsky (Jargowsky), a 
coordinator for appellee Monmouth County Board of 
Health, offered a job to Stanziale as an Environmental 
Specialist at a starting salary of $25,500. Stanziale declined 
the offer. Several months later, in August 1990, Jargowsky 
offered Stanziale a similar job as a Sanitation Inspector at 
a starting salary of $24,500. He accepted this second offer. 
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Shortly after Stanziale was hired, appellees hired a 
younger female, Lisa Muscillo (Muscillo), as a Sanitary 
Inspector, at a starting salary of $26,500. Both Stanziale 
and Muscillo were consistently given 5% raises each year so 
that, in July 1996, their salaries were $32,673 and 
$35,342, respectively. Based on this wage disparity, 
plaintiff filed the present lawsuit.1  
 
Appellees moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 12(b)(6), which the 
District Court converted to a FRCP 56 motion for summary 
judgment. Relevant to this appeal,2 in an opinion dated 
December 18, 1997, the District Court granted appellees' 
motion for summary judgment as to Stanziale's claims of 
discrimination based upon the salary disparity between 
Muscillo and Stanziale. The District Court held that 
Stanziale had met his prima facie burden under McDonnell 
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1983), and that 
appellees had, relevant to Muscillo's salary, offered 
legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for the disparity. 
That court noted that "[p]laintiff has offered only vague 
conclusory statements in response to defendants' proffered 
reasons," and therefore granted summary judgment as to 
the Title VII, ADEA and NJLAD claims. Based solely on 
these findings as to Muscillo's salary, the District Court 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Stanziale's claims of discrimination would eventually be premised on 
the salaries of five women employed by defendants as Sanitary 
Inspectors who were, allegedly, being paid higher salaries than Stanziale. 
Subsequent motions resulted in the District Court determining that 
three of the alleged wage disparities were irrelevant to Stanziale's 
claims. 
Appellant has not contested this determination. Wage disparities 
between Stanziale and the fourth woman were addressed in an opinion 
by the District Court in December 1998. (See footnote 2). 
 
2. The opinion of the District Court dated December 18, 1997, 
articulated several rulings that have not been appealed to this court. In 
addition, the District Court denied defendants' motion for summary 
judgment as to all claims based upon the starting salary of a second 
younger woman Sanitary Inspector, Eve Fuhring-Savino. On subsequent 
motion, in December 1998 the District Court granted summary 
judgment as to claims based upon the disparity in starting salary 
between Stanziale and Fuhring-Savino. Appellant has not presented an 
argument on appeal disputing the merits of the District Court's 
treatment of the claim based on the salary of Fuhring-Savino. 
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also granted summary judgment as to the Equal Pay Act 
and NJEPA claims. 
 
In December 1998, the District Court revisited Stanziale's 
Equal Pay Act and NJEPA claims in the context of a second 
summary judgment motion by appellees. In a second 
opinion, the District Court conceded that claims under the 
Equal Pay Act were not governed by the same standards as 
claims under Title VII and the ADEA, but after 
reconsidering the issue, found that summary judgment had 
been properly granted as to the Equal Pay Act and NJEPA 
claims. 
 
Stanziale has appealed, arguing that summary judgment 
was improperly granted as to the claims based on the wage 
disparity between him and Muscillo. 
 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
Review of the District Court's grant of summary judgment 
is plenary. See Kelly v. Drexel University, 94 F.3d 102, 104 
(3d Cir.1996). We must determine whether the record, 
when viewed in a light favorable to Stanziale, shows that 
there is no genuine issue of material fact and that appellees 
were entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. See, 
e.g., Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); 
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50 
(1986). 
 
IV. DISCUSSION 
 
A. THE ADEA AND TITLE VII CLAIMS 
 
The parties' burdens in establishing and defending claims 
under the ADEA and Title VII3 are determined by the 
procedure set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 
411 U.S. 792 (1973). See Showalter v. University of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. While appellant's brief on appeal does not specifically address the 
District Court's dismissal of the Title VII claim, because the Title VII 
and 
ADEA claims considered by the District Court involve analyses that are 
identical in the present case, this opinion will refer to both the ADEA 
and Title VII claims. 
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Pittsburgh Medical Center, 190 F.3d 231, 234 (3rd Cir. 
1999). A plaintiff must first produce evidence sufficient to 
convince a reasonable factfinder as to all of the elements of 
a prima facie case of discrimination. Id.. If a plaintiff 
establishes a prima facie case, " `[t]he burden of production 
(but not the burden of persuasion) shifts to the defendant, 
who must then offer evidence that is sufficient, if believed, 
to support a finding that the defendant had a legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason for the [adverse employment 
decision].' " Id. at 235 (quoting Keller v. Orix Credit Alliance, 
Inc., 130 F.3d 1101, 1108 (3rd Cir. 1997) (citing Hicks, 509 
U.S. at 506-07, 113 S.Ct. 2742 (1993)); see also Smith v. 
Borough of Wilkinsburg, 147 F.2d 272, 278 (3rd. Cir. 1998). 
An employer need not prove, however, that the proffered 
reasons actually motivated the salary decision. Fuentes v. 
Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 763 (Cir. 1994). If a defendant 
satisfies this burden, a plaintiff may then survive summary 
judgment by submitting evidence from which a factfinder 
could reasonably either (1) disbelieve the employer's 
articulated legitimate reasons; or (2) believe that an 
invidious discriminatory reason was more likely than not a 
motivating or determinative cause of the employer's action. 
Keller, 130 F.3d at 1108; Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 763. 
 
In this case, the District Court found, and the parties do 
not dispute, that Stanziale established a prima facie case. 
Likewise, the parties do not dispute that appellees met their 
burden of production under the second step of the 
McDonnell Douglas framework. They proffered several 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the salary 
disparity between Stanziale and Muscillo -- qualifications 
that Muscillo possessed and Stanziale lacked, including (1) 
a bachelor's degree; (2) a post-graduate education; (3) 
computer skills; (4) job experience using computer skills; 
(5) recent sanitary inspector experience; and (6) 
certifications in pesticide application and lead poisoning 
investigations. Each of these qualifications is documented 
in Muscillo's resume included in the record. The burden 
then fell on Stanziale to demonstrate a triable issue of fact 
through evidence which could cause a reasonable factfinder 
to disbelieve the proffered legitimate reasons or to believe 
that age and/or sex discrimination was more likely than 
not a motivating factor in the hiring decision. 
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Appellant satisfied his burden as to some of these six 
reasons. For instance, as to appellees' argument that 
computer skills explains the disparity in wages, Stanziale 
noted that the Sanitary Inspector job does not require the 
use of computers and that in 1990 the Health Board did 
not even have computers. These facts, if true, could cause 
a reasonable factfinder to conclude that Muscillo's 
"computer skills" and/or "job experience using computer 
skills," offered by appellees as reasons for the wage 
disparity, are pretextual. 
 
Stanziale also argued that the "recent sanitary inspector 
experience" reason offered by appellees was pretextual. 
Stanziale noted that he worked as a Sanitary Inspector for 
an unrelated community for eight years, albeit in the late 
1960's and early 1970's. He testified in his deposition that 
the job had not changed over time, so that his years of 
experience, 17 years before his hiring, ought to be weighed 
more heavily than Muscillo's 1 1/2 years of experience just 
prior to her hire. In essence, Stanziale argued that in his 
estimation, he was more experienced than Muscillo, so that 
there existed a triable issue of fact as to whether appellees' 
proffered reason was pretextual. 
 
Whatever the case as to these factors, it is undisputed 
that Muscillo does possess more qualifications than 
Stanziale, especially as to the bachelor's degree and post- 
graduate education.4 Muscillo has a bachelor's degree in 
business administration. Perhaps more relevant to her work 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. In Fuentes, this court noted that in order to survive summary 
judgment, a plaintiff must provide evidence from which a factfinder 
could reasonably conclude "that each of the employer's proffered non- 
discriminatory" reasons was pretextual. Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 764 
(emphasis in original). As Judge Stapleton notes in partial dissent, this 
court also noted that "the factfinder's rejection of some of the 
defendant's 
proffered reasons may impede the employer's credibility seriously enough 
so that a factfinder may rationally disbelieve the remaining proffered 
reasons". Id. at 764 n. 7. This language does not, of course, provide a 
general rule. Rather, as this language suggests, the relevant, case-by- 
case inquiry is whether the employer's lack of credibility as to some of 
the proffered reasons so seriously undermines its credibility that a 
factfinder could reasonably disbelieve all of the employer's proffered 
reasons. 
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as a Sanitary Inspector, she also has completed a seven- 
week course on environmental and public health and law 
from Rutgers University, is a certified pesticide applicator 
and is a certified operator for a lead poisoning testing 
device. 
 
In response, Stanziale does not dispute that he lacks 
these educational qualifications, but instead notes that he 
was not asked about such qualifications in his interview. 
He alleges that his application for the position of Sanitary 
Inspector (which reveals his lack of these educational 
qualifications) was not provided to appellees until after he 
was hired. From this, Stanziale contends that these 
educational qualifications are not necessary to the job of 
Sanitary Inspector; they were not considered in establishing 
his salary, and they do not, therefore, explain the wage 
disparity. 
 
Assuming that the facts are as Stanziale suggests, it does 
not follow that summary judgment was improperly granted. 
The fact that Stanziale was not asked about his educational 
qualifications does suggest that Muscillo's educational 
qualifications are beyond those minimally required for the 
position of Sanitary Inspector. It also suggests that 
Stanziale's salary was not based on his college and post- 
college education (or lack thereof). However, the fact that 
Muscillo's educational qualifications go beyond those 
minimally required for the position of Sanitary Inspector, or 
the fact that those qualifications go beyond those required 
of Stanziale at his hire, would not preclude appellees from 
considering them in determining Muscillo's salary. 
 
It is, of course, true, as the dissent notes, that employers 
are unlikely to reward employees economically for 
qualifications that are going to make no significant 
contribution to the enterprise. In many instances, plaintiffs 
will satisfy their burden of establishing pretext by 
demonstrating that the employer's alleged qualifications 
bear no actual relationship to the employment at issue. 
Notwithstanding Stanziale's contentions as to what he was 
asked prior to his hiring, he has not presented sufficient 
evidence such that a factfinder could reasonably conclude 
that Muscillo's superior qualifications, particularly her 
qualifications as to lead poisoning, pesticides, and public 
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health and law, are so unrelated to her employment as a 
Sanitary Inspector as to be a pretext for intentional 
discrimination. Under both the ADEA and Title VII, 
Stanziale bears this ultimate burden of proving intentional 
discrimination. See Simpson v. Kay Jewelers, Division of 
Sterling, Inc., 142 F.3d 639, 644 n. 6 (3rd Cir. 1998) 
(quoting Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 763). Summary judgment was 
therefore proper as to the ADEA and Title VII claims, and 
the corresponding state claims under N.J.S.A. S 10:5-12.5 
 
B. THE EQUAL PAY ACT CLAIM 
 
Unlike the ADEA and Title VII claims, claims based upon 
the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. S 206 et seq., do not follow the 
three-step burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas; 
rather, they follow a two-step burden-shifting paradigm. 
The plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case by 
demonstrating that employees of the opposite sex were paid 
differently for performing "equal work"--work of 
substantially equal skill, effort and responsibility, under 
similar working conditions. E.E.O.C. v. Delaware Dept. of 
Health and Social Services, 865 F.2d 1408, 1413-14 (3rd 
Cir. 1989). The burden of persuasion then shifts to the 
employer to demonstrate the applicability of one of the four 
affirmative defenses specified in the Act. Id. at 1414 (citing 
Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S.188, 195 (1974).6 
Thus, the employer's burden in an Equal Pay Act claim -- 
being one of ultimate persuasion -- differs significantly 
from its burden in an ADEA claim. Because the employer 
bears the burden of proof at trial, in order to prevail at the 
summary judgment stage, the employer must prove at least 
one affirmative defense "so clearly that no rational jury 
could find to the contrary." Delaware Dept. of Health, 865 
F.2d at 1414. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Appellant concedes in his brief on appeal that the analysis applicable 
to the ADEA and Title VII claims is also applicable to the state law 
claims under the NJLAD. 
 
6. The four affirmative defenses enumerated under the Act are: (i) a bona 
fide seniority system, (ii) a merit system, (iii) a system which measures 
earnings by quantity or quality of production, or (iv) a differential 
based 
on any factor other than sex. 29 U.S.C. S 206(d)(1). 
 
                                8 
 
 
 
The employer's burden is significantly different in 
defending an Equal Pay Act claim for an additional reason. 
The Equal Pay Act prohibits differential pay for men and 
women when performing equal work "except where such 
payment is made pursuant to" one of the four affirmative 
defenses. 29 U.S.C. S 206(d)(1) (emphasis added). We read 
the highlighted language of the statute as requiring that the 
employer submit evidence from which a reasonable 
factfinder could conclude not merely that the employer's 
proffered reasons could explain the wage disparity, but that 
the proffered reasons do in fact explain the wage disparity. 
See also Delaware Dept. of Health, 865 F.2d at 1415 
(stating that "the correct inquiry was . . . whether, viewing 
the evidence most favorably to the [plaintiff], a jury could 
only conclude that the pay discrepancy resulted from" one 
of the affirmative defenses (emphasis added)). Thus, unlike 
an ADEA or Title VII claim, where an employer need not 
prove that the proffered legitimate nondiscriminatory 
reasons actually motivated the salary decision, see Fuentes, 
32 F.3d at 763, in an Equal Pay Act claim, an employer 
must submit evidence from which a reasonable factfinder 
could conclude that the proffered reasons actually 
motivated the wage disparity. More to the point, where, as 
here, employers seek summary judgment as to the Equal 
Pay Act claim, they must produce sufficient evidence such 
that no rational jury could conclude but that the proffered 
reasons actually motivated the wage disparity of which the 
plaintiff complains. 
 
We have already noted several factors that appellees have 
proffered which could explain the wage disparity, and we 
have no doubt that Muscillo's educational qualifications fall 
within the meaning of the fourth affirmative defense, "a 
differential based on any factor other than sex." 29 U.S.C. 
S 206(d)(1). What is missing in this record, however, is some 
evidence that demonstrates that the decision to pay 
Muscillo a starting salary of $2,000 more than plaintiff was 
in fact made pursuant to these qualifications. 7 Because it 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Significantly, despite the fact that appellee Jargowsky, the individual 
responsible for the hiring of both Stanziale and Muscillo, filed two 
affidavits in this case, one of which describes the qualifications 
Muscillo 
possesses and Stanziale lacks, neither affidavit affirmatively states that 
Muscillo's higher wage was in fact the result of one or more of these 
qualifications. 
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was appellees' burden to establish this fact "so clearly that 
no rational jury could find to the contrary", Delaware Dept. 
of Health, 865 F.2d at 1414, the grant of appellees' motion 
for summary judgment as to the Equal Pay Act and NJEPA 
claims is error. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, the District Court's grant of 
summary judgment as to the ADEA, Title VII and NJLAD 
claims is AFFIRMED. The grant of summary judgment as to 
the Equal Pay Act and NJEPA claims, however, is 
REVERSED. This case is remanded to the District Court for 
further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. 
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STAPLETON, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part: 
 
I join in all of the court's opinion other than section IV-A. 
While it is a close question, unlike my colleagues, I 
conclude that Stanziale has pointed to sufficient evidence of 
pretext to avoid summary judgment on the ADEA and Title 
VII claims. Accordingly, I would reverse and remand for 
further proceedings on those claims, as well as on the 
Equal Pay Act claim. 
 
My conclusion differs from that of my colleagues 
primarily for two reasons. First, while I agree that it does 
not offend the ADEA or Title VII to pay a higher salary to 
one employee than to another based on qualifications 
unrelated to their job performance, I regard the fact that an 
employer purports to have done so as significant 
circumstantial evidence of pretext. Employers rarely reward 
employees for qualifications that are going to make no 
significant contribution to the employer's mission. 
 
Second, because the applicable law regards pretext as 
circumstantial evidence that a prohibited motive is behind 
the employer's decision, a factfinder's conclusion of pretext 
with respect to some of the non-discriminatory 
justifications tendered by the employer may legitimately 
affects its decision with respect to other justifications. As 
we observed in Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 764 n7 (3d 
Cir. 1994): 
 
       We do not hold that, to avoid summary judgment, the 
       plaintiff must cast doubt on each proffered reason in a 
       vacuum. If the defendant proffers a bagful of legitimate 
       reasons, and the plaintiff manages to cast substantial 
       doubt on a fair number of them, the plaintiff may not 
       need to discredit the remainder. That is because the 
       factfinder's rejection of some of the defendant's 
       proffered reasons may impede the employer's credibility 
       seriously enough so that a factfinder may rationally 
       disbelieve the remaining proffered reasons, even if no 
       evidence undermining those remaining rationales in 
       particular is available. 
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